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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Declaration of Independence states that “all men . 
. . are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”1 But 
should any such rights extend to nonhuman entities? This paper argues that 
a proper allocation of an entity’s rights derives from the entity’s value to 
humanity. Part II provides an overview of the history and substance of 
                                                                    
*
 J.D. Candidate 2019, Mitchell Hamline School of Law; B.A. Political Science & 
Communications, University of Minnesota, 2012. 
1
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).  
1
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natural and legal rights. Part III explores the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings 
with regard to the rights and “personhood” of nonhuman entities, 
specifically focusing on corporate and environmental entities. Part IV 
proposes a model of rights allocation which applies the legal theories of 
corporate rights to environmental entities, taking into account such entities’ 
value to humanity.  
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. On the Origin of Rights 
As the Declaration of Independence recognizes, at the heart of the 
question of personhood is the proper allocation and acknowledgment of 
attendant rights.2 Societies throughout history have struggled to determine 
who should be granted rights and to what extent.3 While some governments 
have attempted to enumerate prominent rights,4 the interpretation and 
administration of even these enumerated rights have not been without 
controversy. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court infamously declared in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford “that neither the class of persons who had been 
imported as slaves, nor their descendants” had “rights which the white man 
was bound to respect.”5 Upholding a law stating that “no Black or Mulatto 
person, or Indian shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a 
white man,” the California Supreme Court held that Chinese Americans 
were unable to so testify in court, because they were “inferior, and . . . 
incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point.”6 
Women, of course, were denied the right to vote in the United States until 
1920.7 In Roe v. Wade, the Court held “that the word ‘person,’ . . . does not 
include the unborn.”8 Other examples abound. However, the resolution of 
these questions has always relied fundamentally on the ontological 
determination of the origin of such rights.9 
                                                                    
2
 Id. at ¶ 4. 
3
 See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man (1791), in RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN ANSWER 
TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 10 (Cambridge University Press 
2012). 
4
 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I–X (showing how the United States enumerated several 
important rights by promulgating its Bill of Rights).  
5
 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
6
 People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854).  
7
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  
8
 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).  
9
 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, 
in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 149 (1660), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 
(1823). 
2
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While the Founding Fathers of the United States looked to a Creator 
as the source of a person’s rights,10 others have found answers elsewhere.11 
Immanuel Kant postulated that rights derived from reason alone.12 Thomas 
Hobbes surmised that there was such a time in which no rights existed, 
except that of an instinctual drive for self-defense.13 Dating as far back as 
antiquity, scholars have fixated extensively on distinguishing between natural 
rights—which are innate to a being and cannot be taken away14—and legal 
rights which are granted by a government and can therefore be rescinded.15 
  
The conflict arises, then, when a society is tasked with recognizing, 
distributing, safeguarding, and adjudicating such rights. While recognizing 
an entity as having some basic level of natural rights provides a starting point, 
most metaphysical models impute greater levels of rights to different beings 
according to a hierarchy.16 This differentiation of rights necessarily compels 
a society to develop laws to determine what should be done when the rights 
of different beings conflict.17 Within the realm of U.S. jurisprudence, three 
“levels” of legal rights have emerged—standing, due process, and juridical 
freedoms.  
                                                                    
10
 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776). 
11
 See, e.g., PAINE, supra note 3.  
12
 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (1781), reprinted in THE CAMBRIDGE 
EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood eds., trans.) 
(1998).  
13
 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-
WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL, 79–87 (1651).  
14
 See the Declaration of Independence’s assertion that people are created with “certain 
unalienable Rights” including “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776). 
15
 See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA: TREATISE ON LAW QUESTIONS 90–
97 (1485); JOHN LOCKE, Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil 
Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1660), reprinted in THE WORKS OF 
JOHN LOCKE (1823); THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man (1791), in RIGHTS OF MAN: BEING AN 
ANSWER TO MR. BURKE’S ATTACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2012).  
16
 See, e.g., Great Chain of Being, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Great-Chain-of-Being [https://perma.cc/M4NW-N5LJ]. 
17
 For example, the rights of one person versus another, adults versus children, or humans 
versus animals.  
3
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B. Legal Rights 
1. Standing 
Fundamental to all other legal rights is the legal right of standing. A 
threshold issue requisite to all legal cases, the term “standing” refers to “[a] 
party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or 
right.”18 Because standing is a legal prerequisite to any legal action, standing 
determines whether an entity will have the opportunity to seek legal 
recourse for rights violations in the first place.19  
The basis for this threshold right derives from the “case or 
controversy” clause in Article III of the U.S. Constitution.20 In the interest 
of maintaining a separation of powers among governmental branches and 
system of intergovernmental checks and balances, the Court has determined 
that it must self-moderate the span of cases it can hear.21 Additionally, 
because judicial decisions are typically long-held through the doctrine of 
stare decisis,22 courts have an interest in ensuring that cases are brought by 
the parties with the greatest stake in the outcome of the case, and therefore 
that fervent argument ensues.23 
To acquire standing, a litigant must show three essential elements: (1) 
an injury-in-fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the 
defendant’s conduct, and (3) a likelihood of redressability by the relief 
requested.24 The first element, injury-in-fact, refers to the invasion of a legally 
                                                                    
18
 Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
19
 See id.  
20
 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . to Controversies to which 
the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;— between 
a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens 
of the same State claims Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, and 
the Citizen thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
Id.  
21
 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198–99 (1962) (explaining the Court’s nonjusticiability 
requirements preventing the Court from determining a case). 
22
 A term which literally means “to stand by things decided” and denotes the proposition that 
“a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” 
Stare decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
23
 See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979) (“[A] plaintiff may 
still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid 
deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated 
and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular 
claim.”); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99–100 (1968). 
24
 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
4
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protected interest.25 Such an injury must be concrete and personal rather 
than abstract26 and must be actual and imminent—not hypothetical.27 As the 
Court explained, “[t]he plaintiff must show that he ‘has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the 
challenged official conduct.”28  
The second element necessary to gain standing requires a plaintiff to 
show a causal connection between his injury and the defendant’s conduct.29 
The injury must be “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful 
conduct.”30 Further, the injury cannot be the result of a third party’s 
intervening action.31 Applying this reasoning, the Court held that plaintiffs 
lacked standing to challenge federal funding of an overseas dam building 
project that had the potential to harm endangered species, because other 
countries were funding the project as well.32 These foreign countries were 
therefore intermediaries, breaking the line of causation to the defendant.33  
Finally, for the third element of standing, a litigant must show that the 
relief he has requested is likely to redress his injury and not merely 
speculative.34 For example, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the Court found that 
a plaintiff had established injury-in-fact and causation, but nevertheless 
dismissed the plaintiff’s challenge to a district attorney’s refusal to enforce 
the payment of child support.35 The Court reasoned that the relief requested 
                                                                    
25
 Id. at 560.  
26
 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753–56 (1984). In this case, the Court held that the 
respondents, parents of black children enrolled in schools undergoing desegregation, did not 
have standing to sue the Internal Revenue Service for failing to withhold tax-exempt status 
from racially discriminatory schools. Id. at 753. The Court reasoned that the illegal actions 
of the government and the stigma the children faced due to generalized racist practices were 
not sufficiently concrete and personal so as to satisfy the first element of standing. Id. at 756.  
27
 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (holding that respondent did not have 
standing to seek an injunction prohibiting police officers in the City of Los Angeles, 
California, from utilizing chokeholds when apprehending non-violent suspects because the 
respondent could not show he was going to be placed in a chokehold by Los Angeles police 
in the future). Notably, Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, took a more 
functional approach to standing, arguing that if Lyons, an African American man who was 
gravely harmed after being placed in a chokehold by Los Angeles police, couldn’t bring this 
suit, then no one could. Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
28
 Id. at 101–02 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).  
29
 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
30
 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.  
31
 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
32
 Id. at 571.  
33
 Id. at 562. 
34
 Id. at 561.  
35
 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). 
5
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by the plaintiff (enforcement of a child support order) was unlikely to 
remedy her injury because the penalty for the defendant’s failure to pay the 
support was incarceration—a consequence which would not bring the 
plaintiff any closer to obtaining child support payments.36 Therefore, an 
entity seeking to obtain standing to pursue a legal case must show “a direct 
nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the 
[requested relief].”37 Notably, even small or incremental steps toward the 
advancement of a remedy are sufficient to meet the redressability 
requirement.38 
While these standing requirements apply to most cases, there are some 
special circumstances under which the requirements are relaxed or altered. 
For example, many statutes include “citizen suit provisions” which 
preemptively grant private citizens the right to bring suits against violators of 
the statute or government agencies that fail to discharge a non-discretionary 
duty required under the statute.39 Additionally, under the doctrine of 
“associational standing,” an association can bring a lawsuit on behalf of its 
members if it meets three conditions: (1) its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right, (2) the interests at stake are germane to 
the organization’s purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.40 
Third, under the doctrine of “special solicitude,” U.S. states bringing suit 
on their own behalf are entitled to special consideration and flexibility from 
typical standing requirements and need only prove that there is some 
possibility, rather than a likelihood, that the relief they request will advance 
the remedy sought.41 This consideration is given in light of the particular 
need that states have to protect their quasi-sovereign interests.42 Fourth is a 
narrow exception to the general prohibition on taxpayer standing, which 
ordinarily prevents a plaintiff from utilizing only their status as a taxpayer to 
                                                                    
36
 Id. at 618. 
37
 Id. at 619.  
38
 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1995) (“[A] reform may take one step at a time, addressing 
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”) in holding 
that the regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles was sufficiently poised 
to advance the cause of slowing global warming to merit the grant of standing). 
39
 See 11 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 32:119, Westlaw (database updated September 2019). 
Examples include provisions found in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 6972 (2019), the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 11046 (2019), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2019). 
40
 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (citing Hunt 
v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).  
41
 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–20 (2007).  
42
 Id. at 520. 
6
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gain standing.43 The exception allows taxpayers to challenge federal 
expenditures when their status as a taxpayer enables them to demonstrate 
that they have a personal stake in the controversy and a specific 
constitutional infringement.44 Finally, while standing requirements generally 
prohibit a litigant from bringing a claim on behalf of a third party, courts 
may allow such third-party standing when a litigant can show that his 
relationship with the third party is inextricably bound and that the third party 
has a genuine obstacle to asserting his own rights.45 Outside of these 
exceptions, however, the Lujan requirements remain the default 
prerequisites for an entity to gain standing.46  
2. Due Process 
Once an entity has established the legal right to be heard by 
demonstrating that it has standing, the next level of juridical rights ensures 
that sufficient justification is given,47 and prescribed procedures are 
followed,48 before the entity’s rights can be taken away. This is the doctrine 
of due process. Encoded into U.S. jurisprudence by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments,49 due process is defined as “[t]he conduct of legal 
proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection 
and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair 
                                                                    
43
 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 172 (1974) (citing Frothingham v. Mellon, 
262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). This prohibition is also called the prohibition against “generalized 
grievances.” Id. at 174. 
44
 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1968). For example, as was elicited in Flast, the 
“Taxing and Spending Clause,” which provides, “No Money shall be drawn from the 
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and 
Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time 
to time,” was sufficient for a group of taxpayers to gain standing to challenge federal spending 
on textbooks for religious schools. Id. at 106 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). 
45
 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114–16 (1976) (holding that a physician had standing 
to challenge a state ban on the use of Medicaid funding for patients to obtain abortions 
due to his doctor-patient relationship and patients’ potential concerns for privacy and 
short time limitations).   
46
 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
47
 This right is called “substantive due process.” Due Process, Substantive Due Process, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
48
 This right is called “procedural due process.” Due Process, Procedural Due Process, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
49
 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“. . . nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
7
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hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case.”50 The 
attainment of due process rights ensures that an entity will be safeguarded 
and obtain redress for unfair encroachment of any underlying rights, 
whether natural or otherwise. 
In determining what amount of process is “due” to a particular entity, 
courts employ three distinct standards of review. The most rigorous level, 
called “strict scrutiny,” applies to controversies involving fundamental 
rights51 or suspect classes of persons.52 To satisfy strict scrutiny, the 
government must show that it has a compelling governmental interest in 
restricting a fundamental right or burdening a suspect class, and that it has 
utilized the least restrictive mechanism in doing so.53 Furthermore, courts 
will only consider direct and substantial infringements on a right to trigger 
heightened judicial scrutiny.54 Such infringements must typically consist of 
an outright ban or significant disincentive to exercising a right.55 Such a 
heightened level of review is very difficult to meet and therefore has proven 
to be extremely protective of an entity’s underlying rights.56  
                                                                    
50
 Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
51
 The determination of which rights qualify as “fundamental” has largely evolved throughout 
United States jurisprudence, but has come to include rights enumerated in the Constitution—
such as the freedom of speech, association, and exercise of religion—as well as interests 
“traditionally protected by our society” and “rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people”—such as marriage, privacy, voting, and property ownership. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. I; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).  
52
 Suspect classes include distinctions made on the basis of race or nationality. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–
72 (1971) (holding that classifications based on citizenship or alien status are “inherently 
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny”); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 
(1964) (holding that racial classifications are “constitutionally suspect”).  
53
 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  
54
 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1978).  
55
 See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45, 67 (2d 
Cir. 2018).  
56
 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding laws banning 
gay marriage unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 
S. Ct. 2218, 2226–33 (2015) (holding laws restricting the display of signs based on their 
content as unconstitutional); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 745–48 (2007) (overturning school policies that assign students to different schools 
based on their race); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 220 (holding that all racial 
classifications, whether intended to benefit or harm minorities, are subject to strict scrutiny); 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning the United States flag is a 
form of speech protected by the First Amendment and thus requires strict scrutiny); 
Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728–29 (1973) (overturning a state law that restricted 
non-U.S. citizens from taking the bar exam to obtain certification to practice law); Loving, 
388 U.S. at 12 (overturning a ban on interracial marriages); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
8
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The second level of review the government may be required to meet 
to satisfy due process is called “intermediate scrutiny.”57 This standard 
applies to quasi-suspect classes such as restrictions based on gender58 or a 
child’s legitimacy.59 At this level, the government must prove that it has an 
important governmental interest in restricting the entity’s rights and that the 
mechanism chosen to do so is substantially related to achieving that 
interest.60  
The final standard of review is called “rational basis review.”61 This 
standard is used for all remaining allegations of rights restrictions and 
requires a challenging entity to prove that the government had no legitimate 
interest in restricting their rights.62 In other words, the means chosen to do 
so were not rationally related to achieving the interest proffered.63 At this 
level of review, the restriction of rights is typically upheld unless the 
government’s action is clearly wrong, arbitrary, or not an exercise of 
judgment.64 
3. Juridical Freedoms 
The final level of legal rights recognized in U.S. jurisprudence are the 
juridical freedoms granted by our nation’s laws and precedent—many of 
which are enumerated in the Constitution.65 They include the freedoms of 
                                                                    
U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a ban on the use of, or assistance in 
obtaining, birth control for married couples). 
57
 Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
58
 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). 
59
 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). 
60
 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (stating “classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
61 
See Rational-Basis Test, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
62
 Questions of legitimacy have largely been interpreted as relating to the states’ traditional 
“police” powers—such as the protection of public safety, health, and morals—as well as 
virtually any goal that is not constitutionally forbidden. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 
32 (1954) (explaining how “[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and 
order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of 
the police power.”). Generally, any conceivable interest is sufficient to meet this prong of the 
test, and that interest need not be the government’s actual purpose in enacting the restriction. 
See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).  
63
 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
64
 See Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986); Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 
(1976); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).   
65
 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, II, XV, XIX, XXVI. But see U.S. CONST. amend. IX. (stating 
that the enumeration of some rights in the Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”). 
9
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speech66 and the press;67 the rights to assemble,68 exercise religion,69 bear 
arms,70 and vote;71 and the rights to marry,72 procreate,73 own property,74 and 
maintain privacy.75 While this list is only a short iteration of the many rights 
the U.S. government grants or recognizes to varying degrees, it demonstrates 
the wide variety of freedoms that the United States has deemed necessary 
and proper for persons to bear. In returning to our original quandary, 
however, we now consider what legal rights—if any—nonhuman entities 
within the United States bear.  
III. RIGHTS OF NONHUMAN ENTITIES 
A. Corporate Rights 
U.S. jurisprudence has considered two main theories of corporate 
personhood in determining whether corporations have rights: (1) whether 
they have rights independently as “persons” and (2) whether their owners’ 
rights must be imputed to them because the owners act through the 
corporation. 
1. Corporate Personhood Prior to Citizens United 
“Corporate personhood” refers to the concept that an entity, such as a 
corporation, has many or all of the same legally recognized rights and duties 
as a human being.76 While the concept of corporate personhood is now an 
accepted notion within U.S. jurisprudence, this was not always so. Questions 
about the status and rights of corporations have been raised throughout the 
nation’s history.77 In 1809, one of the earliest cases considering corporate 
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 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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 See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXVI.  
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 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
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 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  
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 U.S. CONST. amends. X, XIV. 
75
 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–65 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 485 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV.  
76
 See Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
77
 Of course, many of these questions have been, and continue to be, contentiously 
confronted in other countries throughout the world. For example, Marxism brought about a 
new understanding of corporate personhood. Marxism recognizes the corporate personhood 
of the working classes (the proletariat) while rejecting the corporate personhood of 
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rights, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “That invisible, intangible, and artificial 
being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a 
citizen; and, consequently, cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United 
States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in 
their corporate name.”78 In 1819, the Supreme Courtheld that Dartmouth 
College, a corporate entity, was entitled to the same Constitutional 
protections that individuals enjoy when entering into contracts. 79 In 1886, 
the Court considered whether the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment should be applied to railroad corporations.80 
Reflecting on the case, Justice Black wrote, “this Court . . . decided for the 
first time that the word ‘person’ in the amendment did in some instances 
include corporations.”81  
The issue of governmental regulation of corporate spending during 
political elections helped define the notion of corporate personhood in the 
late twentieth century. In the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo, the Court held 
that bans on corporate expenditures during political elections were 
inherently bans on free speech.82 It admonished, “the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order 
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”83 Two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
the Court provided  further foundation for the notion of corporate 
personhood when it held that prohibiting corporate campaign contributions 
infringed on corporations’ “protected speech in a manner unjustified by a 
compelling state interest.”84 It further opined that political speech is 
“indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true 
because the speech comes from a corporation.”85  
However, over a decade later, the Court initiated a complete paradigm 
shift regarding its view of corporate personhood. In Austin v. Michigan 
                                                                    
businesses and individual nation states. See, e.g., KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE 
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848). Conversely, historical Fascism opined that citizens 
speaking a common language and sharing a national history composed a corporate 
personhood, chiefly subsiding in the State. See, e.g., BENITO MUSSOLINI & GIOVANNI 
GENTILE, THE DOCTRINE OF FASCISM (1932).  
78
 Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).  
79
 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 712 (1819). 
80
 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886).  
81
 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938) (citing S. Pac. R.R. Co., 
118 U.S. at 394).  
82
 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976). 
83
 Id. at 48–49.  
84
 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).  
85
 Id. at 777.  
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Chamber of Commerce, the Court upheld a state campaign financing law 
that prohibited corporations from contributing general treasury finances to 
elections.86 In so doing, the Court determined that corporations were not, in 
fact, “persons” protected by the First Amendment.87 In 2003, the Court 
reinforced Austin’s holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
finding that the regulation of corporate political financing was necessary to 
prevent political corruption impairing the public good and democratic 
integrity.88 
Overall, the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the notion of 
corporate personhood demonstrate the varying levels of juridical rights 
granted to corporations within U.S. jurisprudence. The corporate 
protections of the Bellotti and Buckley era shifted dramatically to restrict 
corporate personhood in Austin and McConnell and set the stage for the 
re-examination of corporate personhood in Citizens United.89  
2. Corporate Personhood in Citizens United 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court was again faced with the 
question of corporate rights. Citizens United, a conservative, nonprofit 
corporation, challenged Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations 
restricting corporate campaign contributions and public distribution of 
“electioneering communications.”90 The corporation had produced a film 
prior to the 2008 presidential elections entitled Hillary: The Movie which 
portrayed then-Senator Hillary Clinton in a negative light.91 Citizens United 
argued that the laws violated its First Amendment rights by distinguishing 
between corporate and individual speakers, and that corporate political 
speech was entitled to the same protection as individual speakers’ rights.92 
The FEC, in defending the regulations, argued that limitations on 
corporate speech were necessary to protect citizens from “the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to 
the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”93 Agreeing that the 
regulations were a ban on a fundamental right to corporate free speech, the 
                                                                    
86
 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990).  
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 See id.  
88
 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003).  
89
 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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 Id. at 321. 
91
 Id. at 319–20.  
92
 Id. at 321, 330.  
93
 Id. at 348 (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
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Court had to determine whether, under the strict scrutiny standard, the laws 
sufficiently furthered a compelling governmental interest and were narrowly 
tailored toward that end.94 Here, the distinction between individuals and 
corporations was of central importance. Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, stated, “If §441b applied to individuals, no one would believe that 
it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and 
effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be 
suspect.”95 Furthermore, “wealthy individuals and unincorporated 
associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent expenditures . . 
. . Yet certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on 
the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political 
speech.”96 Ultimately finding in favor of Citizens United, the Court stated: 
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the 
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the 
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and 
respect for the speaker’s voice. The Government may not by these 
means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine 
for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. 
The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas 
that flow from each.97 
Therefore, in a complete reversal from the holdings of Austin and 
McConnell, Citizens United extended First Amendment protections to 
corporations as “persons” entitled to free speech rights.98  
 3. Corporate Personhood in Hobby Lobby 
The Supreme Court recently revisited the notion of corporate 
personhood with respect to another First Amendment protection: religious 
liberty.99 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court considered 
whether a law requiring corporations to provide its employees with health 
insurance coverage for contraceptives violated the First Amendment.100 The 
corporations in this case included several closely held, for-profit companies 
                                                                    
94
 Id. at 337, 340 (finding the strict scrutiny standard appropriate because the regulations 
infringed on a fundamental right—the freedom of speech). 
95
 Id. at 339. 
96
 Id. at 356 (citation omitted). 
97
 Id. at 340–41. 
98
 Id. at 371–72.  
99
 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
100
 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014).  
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owned by individuals whose religious objections to certain contraceptives 
conflicted with the law’s requirements.101 They sought injunctive relief under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993102 to enjoin application of the contraceptive 
mandate.103  
Lower courts that considered the case held that the for-profit 
corporations should not be exempted from the law on religious liberty 
grounds because their participation in the for-profit marketplace subjected 
them to different standards than private citizens.104 The Third Circuit stated, 
“General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions 
of belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. 
They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-
motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of 
their individual actors.”105 Thus, the Supreme Court was required to 
consider whether the personal beliefs of a corporation’s owners could be 
imputed to the corporation itself, and therefore, whether religious liberty 
protections applied.106 
Reversing the lower court’s decision and holding for the corporations, 
the Supreme Court stated, “Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are 
incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make 
money flies in the face of modern corporate law.”107 Turning to the source 
of corporations’ personhood, the Court explained, “Corporations, ‘separate 
and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by 
them, cannot do anything at all.”108 “When rights, whether constitutional or 
statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights 
of these people.”109 Holding the health insurance mandate to be unlawful, 
the Court again extended juridical freedoms to corporations pursuant to the 
First Amendment.110 However, this was accomplished on very different 
                                                                    
101
 Id. at 700–03.  
102
 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
103
 Id. at 701, 703.  
104
 Id. at 702, 704. 
105
 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. 
Supp. 2d 1278, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d en banc, 723 F. 3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013)).  
106
 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 705. 
107
 Id. at 684.  
108
 Id. at 707 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties, 724 F.3d at 385). 
109
 Id. at 706–07. 
110
 Id. at 736. 
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grounds than those in Citizens United and its forbearers.111 Rather than 
granting rights to corporations as attendant to their status as “people,” the 
Court based its decision on the desire to protect the rights of the underlying 
people who make up corporations.112 
B. Environmental Rights 
Even on the most basic level, U.S. jurisprudence has declined to grant 
environmental entities—natural objects such as trees, mountains, and bodies 
of water—any legal rights.113 In Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court 
considered a suit by an environmental group seeking an injunction to 
prevent the development of a Disney ski resort in Sequoia National Park.114 
The Court ruled that because the environmental group had failed to 
demonstrate a “direct stake in the outcome” of the controversy, it failed to 
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement necessary to gain standing.115  
Dissenting from this outcome, Justice Douglas opined that 
“[c]ontemporary public concern for protecting nature’s ecological 
equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental 
objects to sue for their own preservation.”116 Likening such suits to other 
                                                                    
111
 Compare Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706–07 (holding that religious liberty protections 
extended to corporations because corporations are made up of persons deserving of religious 
liberty rights), with Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. at 372 (holding the 
corporations themselves were “persons” to whom First Amendment protections should 
apply). 
112
 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 691. Of note is the discussion the Court had regarding the 
business owners’ choice of the corporate form under which to operate their business. Id. at 
712. The Court noted the significant advantages gained by organizing under the corporate 
form, “such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legislation or campaigning for 
political candidates who promote their religious or charitable goals.” Id. Additionally, liability 
protections, taxation considerations, cost, and investor considerations play into the choice of 
form decision. WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL 
APPROACH 73–124 (2d ed. 2016). An alternative to the traditional corporate form that has 
been gaining growing popularity in the U.S. is called a “benefit corporation,” which allows 
an organization to organize with the dual purpose of achieving a socially-minded goal for the 
benefit of the public as well as a profit for the owners. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 712–13. 
This form may prove very useful for those who wish to operate a business while 
incorporating the central tenets of their faith into the company’s operating documents.  
113
 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739–41 (1972); Christopher D. Stone, Should 
Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 
459 (1972).  
114
 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 729–30.  
115
 Id. at 740–41. 
116
 Id. at 741–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
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contexts in which legal standing is conferred upon inanimate objects,117 
Justice Douglas argued that the environmental “‘aesthetic’ and 
‘conservational’ interests [are] sufficiently threatened to satisfy the case-or-
controversy clause,” as required by Article III of the U.S. Constitution.118 
This call has been echoed by others who similarly argue that natural objects 
should be recognized as legal rights holders on their own accord, 
empowered with standing to “institute legal actions at [their own] behest.”119 
The ruling of the Court, however, has maintained that environmental 
entities may not bring legal actions—let alone claim other legal rights—
without the intervention of a human being who can demonstrate an invasion 
of his rights.120 
C. Rights of Other Nonhuman Entities  
While this paper’s focus is primarily restricted to discussion of 
corporate and environmental rights, it is worth noting that courts have also 
considered the legal rights of other nonhuman entities within U.S. 
jurisprudence. Ships, for example, are treated as separate juridical entities 
that can bring suits and face prosecution in their own right.121 Conversely, as 
of yet, courts have not extended legal standing rights to animals.122 In several 
recent cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has opined that an animal 
could assert standing in its own right, independent from a human being.123 
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 Such as ships in maritime law and corporations. Id. at 742 nn.2–3 (citing Reid v. Barry, 
112 So. 846 (Fla. 1927); GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 
31 (1957)). 
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 Id. at 741 n.1 (referencing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).  
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 Stone, supra note 114, at 458. 
120
 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739. 
121
 See United States v. Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612) 
(“[T]his is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding against the vessel, for an 
offense committed by the vessel . . . .”). See also Ventura Packers, Inc. v. F/V Jeanine 
Kathleen, 424 F.3d 852, 861 (9th Cir. 2005); Aurora Shipping Co. v. Boyce, 191 F. 960, 968 
(9th Cir. 1911); Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Tug M/V Ellen S. Bouchard, 377 F. Supp. 3d 230 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).  
122
 Though, notably, a wide array of statutory efforts have yielded significant advancements in 
the recognition of certain animal rights, including imposing criminal penalties on those who 
mistreat or neglect animals. See, e.g., African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 
4201–4246; Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2160; Horse Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1821–1831; Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340; see 
also N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 356 (requiring that all confined animals have access to 
clean air, water, shelter, and food); CAL. PENAL CODE § 597a (imposing criminal penalties 
for the transportation of animals in a cruel or inhumane way). 
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 See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 422–23 (9th Cir. 2018); Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 
F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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In considering a copyright claim brought by a monkey named Naruto who 
took a picture of itself, the court wrote:  
Naruto’s lack of a next friend does not destroy his standing to sue, 
as having a “case or controversy” under Article III of the 
Constitution . . . . [T]he court has “broad discretion and need not 
appoint a guardian ad litem [or next friend] if it determines the 
person is or can be otherwise adequately protected.”124  
Although the court eventually dismissed Naruto’s claim for lack of 
statutory standing under the Copyright Act, it did note that “Naruto’s Article 
III standing . . . is not dependent on PETA’s [People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals] sufficiency as a guardian or ‘next friend.’”125 Although 
this language is arguably all dicta and has not been deliberated in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, it certainly presents an interesting insight into the current 
trajectory of the legal rights of animals. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Having discussed the historical and legal landscapes surrounding the 
notions of corporate and environmental rights, we now turn to an analysis 
of the proper allocation and enforcement of these rights. As the proceeding 
analysis will show, because corporate rights are the manifestation of human 
rights, their allocation and enforcement are inextricably bound to the 
existence and enforcement of human rights. Correspondingly, the allocation 
and enforcement of environmental rights are likewise inextricable from the 
existence and enforcement of human rights. Finally, the precepts behind 
state and corporate rights are applicable to the proper allocation and 
enforcement of environmental rights.  
In proceeding, it is necessary to consider the purpose and end goals of 
law.126 U.S. jurisprudence has expressed that the fundamental ends protected 
by bestowing legal rights upon people are to “make men free to develop 
their faculties,”127 respect their dignity and choice,128 and facilitate the value of 
individual self-realization.129 Therefore, the legal rights due to any single 
                                                                    
124
 Naruto, 888 F.3d at 422–23 (quoting United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 
805 (9th Cir. 1986)).  
125
 Id. at 423.  
126
 Thomas Aquinas surmised that law serves four primary functions: affecting justice, 
maintaining or restoring order, promoting the common good, and helping those 
subject to the law to live virtuous lives. AQUINAS, supra note 15. 
127
 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).  
128
 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
129
 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 594 (1982). 
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entity must be considered in relation to, and in proportion to, the ends that 
are sought. 
A. Corporate Personhood 
The Court’s analysis in Citizens United focused on whether 
corporations merited First Amendment protections as “people” in their 
own right.130 Conversely, in Hobby Lobby, the Court extended rights to 
corporations not based on the corporations’ own personhood, but rather to 
protect the human persons comprising the corporations.131 In this distinction 
lies the key to delineating the proper allocation of corporate rights.  
1. Corporate Rights Are The Manifestation of Human Rights 
 “Corporation” is defined as “[a]n entity having authority under law to 
act as a single person,” or “a group or succession of persons established in 
accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic person.”132 The word 
“corporation” derives from the Latin “corporare” meaning “combine in one 
body.”133 This characterization of corporations as a conglomeration of 
human persons underscores the inherent anthropocentric nature of 
corporations. Corporations are man-made entities formed by the law, under 
the law. They are developed to fulfill the needs and desires of their human 
creators.134 Therefore, the rights they hold ought to be commensurate to 
their nature as such.  
As Justice Stevens expressed in his dissent to Citizens United, “The 
conceit that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in 
the political sphere is . . . inaccurate . . . . [T]he distinction between 
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make enormous 
contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it.”135 
Continuing, he added, “[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no 
                                                                    
130
 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336–67 (2009). 
131
 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014). 
132
 Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
133
 Corporation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
134
 The corporate form provides several notable advantages for the operation of a business, 
including shielding its owners from personal liability for commercial torts and obligations, 
facilitating outside investment, and enabling property to be held in perpetuity. See WILLIAM 
K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 73–124 (2d 
ed. 2016); Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People? Excavating the Legal 
Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-
companies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution [https://perma.cc/37C8-JMWE]. 
135
 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
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feelings, no thoughts, no desires . . . . [T]hey are not themselves members 
of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was 
established.”136 Extending the title of “personhood” to nonhuman entities 







2. The Existence And Enforcement of Corporate Rights Are 
Inextricable From The Existence And Enforcement of Human 
Rights 
Any time a right is granted to a person or group of people, there is the 
potential for conflict with another’s rights.138 The free press very frequently 
leads to an imposition on others’ right to privacy.139 Property ownership 
necessarily precludes the right of others to assemble in certain areas without 
permission.140 Similarly, the right to free speech or free exercise of religion 
may very well impede upon another’s ability to exercise their rights fully. 
However, the weighing of such rights is precisely what our legal system was 
developed to address.141 These concerns are not limited to the realm of 
corporate rights, but rather are concerns addressed daily on the individual 
level. In so doing, the U.S. judicial system has established the multi-layered 
due process framework for evaluating the level of scrutiny necessary before 
                                                                    
136
 Id. at 466.  
137
 See supra Section II.A. 
138
 See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding the Boy Scouts had 
the right to exclude an individual from membership because of his sexual orientation, based 
on the group’s right to freedom of expressive association). 
139
 See Kimberly A. Dietel, Note, Shadow on the Spotlight: The Right to Newsgather Versus 
the Right to Privacy, 33 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 131, 132–33 (1999). 
140
 For a discussion of property and First Amendment rights as they relate to privately owned 
shopping malls, see Alysa B. Freeman, Comment, Go to the Mall with My Parents?? A 
Constitutional Analysis of the Mall of America’s Juvenile Curfew, 102 DICK. L. REV. 481, 
488 pt. II (1998). 
141
 Cf. Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits 
of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U.L. REV. 1275, 1279 (1998) (“Eighteenth-century 
Americans understood freedom of speech within the framework of natural rights theory . . . 
. Like all such rights, however, it was bounded by the rights of others. Because government 
was instituted to protect rights, it had an obligation not only to respect liberty of speech, but 
also to ensure that this liberty was not used to violate other fundamental rights.”). 
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an entity’s rights can be said to have been unduly violated.142 Just as was done 
in both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, courts must balance whether 
the alleged rights violation rises to the level of severity requisite for judicial 
intervention.143  
However, a proper balancing first requires an accurate assessment of 
the parties involved and consideration of the societal values at stake. In 
Citizens United, the Court became swept up in the metaphor of 
corporations as people and failed to accurately delineate the true nature and 
purpose of corporations.144 In contrast, the Court in Hobby Lobby accurately 
articulated that “the purpose of extending rights to corporations is to protect 
the rights of people associated with the corporation, including shareholders, 
officers, and employees. Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held 
corporations thus protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and 
control them.”145 
Corporations are not people. They do not derive rights from their own 
personhood, but rather merit juridical protection only to the extent that the 
rights of the people making up those corporations are threatened. The 
decision to operate under the corporate form does not strip any person of 
their rights, but rather must be weighed into the balance of the degree of 
conflict with other human persons’ rights, the extent of the process due to 
such persons, and the end goals of law.  
B. Legal Rights of Natural Objects 
As indicated by Justice Douglas’ dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, a 
similar debate has been sparked with regard to the legal rights and 
“personhood” of natural environmental objects.146 Legal scholar Christopher 
Stone asserts that environmental rights should be analogized to the judicial 
rights of corporations.147 He states, “I am proposing we do the same with 
eagles and wilderness areas as we do with copyrighted works, patented 
inventions, and privacy: make the violation of rights in them to be a cost by 
declaring the ‘pirating’ of them to be the invasion of a property interest.”148 
To accomplish this vision, Stone suggests instituting a guardianship system, 
which would allow “a friend of a natural object [who] perceives it to be 
                                                                    
142
 See supra Section II.B.2.  
143
 See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989). 
144
 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342.  
145
 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 683–84. 
146
 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742–43 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
147
 See Stone, supra note 114, at 464. 
148
 Id. at 476.  
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endangered, [to] apply to a court for the creation of a guardianship.”149 As a 
guardian, Stone postulates, that a person “would be entitled to raise the 
land’s rights in the land’s name, i.e., without having to make the roundabout 
and often unavailing demonstration . . . that the ‘rights’ of the club’s 
members were being invaded.”150  
However, as Stone himself admits, there are several acute ontological 
problems with this proposal.151 The old adage that a tree falling alone in the 
woods makes no sound is emblematic of the problem elicited by the notion 
of environmental rights. If a society were to grant natural objects 
independent legal rights, by what mechanism would these rights be asserted, 
adjudicated, and enforced? A tree can no more easily issue a summons and 
complaint than it can transmit its dying groans, absent a human audience. 
How would such a guardian divine the “wants” and “needs” of a natural 
object? Surely a forest—could it speak—would protest being burned to the 
ground; yet controlled burns have been proven to provide great benefit to 
the regeneration and strengthening of forests.152 Furthermore, a colony of 
elm bark beetles wreaking destruction on a forest of Dutch elm trees would 
surely wish to raise a case opposing their extermination. Yet presumably the 
trees themselves would wish to petition for their own protection. If standing 
were granted enabling environmental entities to raise such issues, courts 
would inevitably be inundated with cases forcing them to weigh the 
competing interests of a multitude of species. 
Another complication the notion of environmental rights elicits is the 
difficulty of defining the bounds of one environmental entity from another. 
How would one delineate a stream, for example, from its source?153 Courts 
have already shown themselves to be ill-disposed toward resolving such 
issues as how to define a wetland or at what point a wetland becomes wet 
no longer.154 Furthermore, if a guardian were appointed for one entity and 
another guardian for a separate, but connected entity, how would potentially 
inconsistent judgments be resolved? 
Finally, Stone’s proposal also fails to provide a solution for the 
underlying difficulty of asking a court to put a value on environmental 
                                                                    
149
 Id. at 464. 
150
 Id. at 466.  
151
 See id. at 464 n.49. 
152
 MINN. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., THE BENEFITS OF PRESCRIBED BURNING ON PRIVATE LAND 
1 (1994), 
https://files.dnr.state.mn.us/assistance/backyard/privatelandsprogram/benefits_prescribed_
burning.pdf [https://perma.cc/63K9-EFN7].  
153
 See Stone, supra note 114, at 464 n.49. 
154
 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006).  
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destruction.155 As Stone himself acknowledges, determining the “fair market 
value” for many natural objects is simply not possible.156 It requires complete 
reliance on the subjective values of any given subset of society. Whose 
estimation of value should govern? Certainly, a farming community would 
weigh the interests of developing cropland over those of preserving a 
wetland. The debate over the Keystone XL Pipeline perfectly evidences the 
conflicting values held by those whose livelihoods depend on the use of 
natural resources versus those who value land for its historical, aesthetic, or 
spiritual significance.157 Moreover, some environmental damages, no matter 
the amount of the judgment, are irreversible and can never be “made 
whole.”  
Stone offers two potential solutions to this issue. First, he suggests that 
these problems could be “sidestepped” by “making the ocean whole 
somewhere else, in some other way.”158 By this, he seems to suggest that if 
destruction cannot be avoided in one area, then those who wish to utilize 
that area must pay to have another area ameliorated somewhere else. 
Alternatively, he proposes establishing a “trust fund” subsidized by all 
taxpayers and the proceeds of successful environmental suits to address 
environmental losses on the whole.159 This fund, Stone suggests, could also 
be used to satisfy judgments against the environment itself inevitably brought 
by those who are injured by natural objects, as justice would necessitate.160 
However, both of these solutions are wrought with impediments. 
First, ameliorating the problem elsewhere does not resolve the issue of 
competing values at the original site. Telling a Native American tribe that 
they can resume their veneration of sacred land at an alternative site is not 
bound to end in agreement. Nor can the historical value of a certain area 
simply be transplanted elsewhere. Stone’s “sidestepping” solution fails to 
address the underlying problems of environmental degradation: Fixing the 
environment elsewhere will not result in relief being granted where it is 
presently needed.   
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 See Stone, supra note 114, at 476. 
156
 See id. at 478. 
157




 Id. at 478.  
159
 See id. at 480–81.  
160
 Id. at 481. Indeed, in ancient and medieval times, judgments were pronounced against 
natural objects, such as in cases of trees that fell and killed a person. However, these 
judgments consisted of the surrender of the tree to the deceased’s family or the Church, 
rather than any monetary award. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 19, 24 
(1881). 
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Secondly, ameliorating the environment elsewhere would entirely 
undermine the very notion that Stone proffers—that natural objects are 
entitled to legal rights in and of themselves.161 If cutting down a tree to make 
way for a road can be cured by planting a new forest elsewhere, then the 
tree itself is not valued or receiving redress. Considerations of 
environmental rights necessarily extend beyond the particularized decisions 
at individual sites.  
Such ontological issues again arise when considering “who” is 
responsible for such natural disasters when they occur. As Stone 
acknowledges, “when the Nile overflows, is it the ‘responsibility’ of the 
river? the mountains? the snow? the hydrological cycle?”162 And when the 
dialogue regarding human-caused climate change is added to the mix, the 
allocation of fault becomes Sisyphean. Establishing a taxpayer-funded trust 
account places the responsibility on all Americans. Should all of society be 
made to pay the price for the destruction wreaked most heavily by the few? 
Such a proposition certainly smacks of injustice considering the prohibition 
on taxpayer standing discussed above.163 Moreover, as Stone recognizes, the 
true costs of environmental degradation are often borne most heavily by the 
poor and marginalized in society.164  
                                                                    
161
 See Stone, supra note 114, at 456. 
162
 Id. at 481. 
163
 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974); supra Section II.B.1. One 
cannot help but wonder if such things do not seem to have an internal justice of their own 
and are best relegated to the court of nature itself.    
164
 Stone, supra note 114, at 477 n.87 (“[T]he poor quite possibly will bear the brunt of the 
compromises.”). Pope Francis, too, took up this cry in his papal encyclical Laudato Si’ in 
which he wrote: 
  [T]he deterioration of the environment and of society affects the most vulnerable 
people on the planet: ‘Both everyday experience and scientific research show that 
the gravest effects of all attacks on the environment are suffered by the 
poorest.’ For example, the depletion of fishing reserves especially hurts small 
fishing communities without the means to replace those resources; water pollution 
particularly affects the poor who cannot buy bottled water; and rises in the sea level 
mainly affect impoverished coastal populations who have nowhere else to go. The 
impact of present imbalances is also seen in the premature death of many of the 
poor, in conflicts sparked by the shortage of resources, and in any number of other 
problems which are insufficiently represented on global agendas . . . . [W]e have 
to realize that a true ecological approach always becomes a social approach; it must 
integrate questions of justice in debates on the environment, so as to hear both the 
cry of the earth and the cry of the poor. 
Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, ¶¶ 48–49, (May 24, 2015), 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P43L-6G2X] (quoting 
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1. The Existence And Enforcement of Environmental Rights Are 
Inextricable From The Existence And Enforcement of Human 
Rights 
All of these issues show that considerations of environmental rights are 
inextricably entwined with discussions of human values and human rights.165 
Certainly, protecting the environment is a worthy and vital cause. But 
preventing environmental degradation at all costs—up to and including the 
complete erasure of humanity166—is not a just and cogent solution. So what 
is man to do? Do we forsake our own natural rights to life and liberty for 
the sake of the planet on which we find ourselves? Or is there a way to 
protect the unique dignity attending our own humanity while also conserving 
the environment which enables us to continue living?  
The conclusion that these issues demand is that the universe was 
created for humanity and finds its destiny in man.167 Determining the value 
                                                                    
Bolivian Bishops’ Conference, Pastoral Letter on the Environment and Human 
Development in Bolivia El universo, don de Dios para la vida 17 (Mar. 23, 2012)).  
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 See Pope Francis, supra note 165, ¶ 48 at 33 (“The human environment and the natural 
environment deteriorate together; we cannot adequately combat environmental 
degradation unless we attend to causes related to human and social degradation.”).  
166
 Indeed, there are those who would call for the total extinction of humanity for the sake of 
preserving the environment. For example, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement has 
as its mission, “Phasing out the human race by voluntarily ceasing to breed [to] allow Earth’s 
biosphere to return to good health.” Les Knight, THE VOLUNTARY HUMAN EXTINCTION 
MOVEMENT, http://vhemt.org/ [https://perma.cc/S2U4-C3NS]. Similarly, there is a growing 
movement in which people are choosing not to have children in order to reduce carbon 
emissions and the use of resources. See Amy Fleming, Would You Give Up Having 
Children to Save the Planet? Meet the Couples Who Have, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/20/give-up-having-children-couples-save-
planet-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/A9UB-LNP5]. Further, the Anti-Natalist movement 
espouses a philosophy that the creation of new human life is a negative thing. Its progenitors 
point to the suffering that human life involves, both for people themselves and for other 
species that suffer because of humans, and suggest that because of such suffering, the 
generation of new life should be avoided. See DAVID BENATAR, BETTER NEVER TO HAVE 
BEEN 8 (2006). 
167
 Joseph Michalak, Dir. of the Inst. for Diaconate Formation, The Seminaries of Saint Paul, 
Address at the Catechetical Institute (February 11, 2018). See also Pope Saint Paul VI, 
Lumen Gentium, ¶ 48 (Nov. 21, 1964), 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html [https://perma.cc/PQW7-KWKX].   
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of environmental protection is inherently anthropocentric. Any tool 
selected will necessarily center on the environment’s value to humankind 
rather than any inherent value of the entity in and of itself—whether the 
valuation is calculated based on the real estate value of the land, market 
value of its resources, or a more elusive societal value in preserving the 
environment for unborn generations. As Stone concedes, it is intractable to 
suggest “that the mountain, or the planet earth, or the cosmos, is concerned 
about whether the pines stand or fall . . . . [T]he cosmos [does not] care if 
we humans persist or not.”168 Therefore, just as in the case of corporate 
rights, the concept of environmental rights must be analyzed with a view 
toward the protection of human rights and the fulfillment of the end goals 
of law. 
2. The Precepts Behind State And Corporate Rights Are 
Applicable To The Allocation And Enforcement of 
Environmental Rights  
Revisiting the Court’s rationales for imposing standing requirements at 
the outset, we must consider whether “granting trees standing” would be in 
the best interest of our nation’s traditions of safeguarding the separation of 
powers, ensuring checks and balances, and impelling fervent argumentation 
by litigants who are in the best position to bring a case.169 As it currently 
stands, the protection of environmental entities is largely delegated to the 
individual states and specific federal agencies, such as the Department of 
the Interior (DOI) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).170 In 
so delegating this power, the Supreme Court referred to the “quasi-
sovereign interests” that states have to protect their citizens and the natural 
resources within their borders:171  
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of 
outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree 
                                                                    
168
 See Stone, supra note 114, at 471–72 n.73.  
169
 See supra Section II.B.1.; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
170
 See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (holding “the State has an 
interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and 
its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (holding 
“it must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are 
threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend them.”); Knight v. United 
Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891) (holding “[t]he [S]ecretary [of the Interior] is the 
guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands.”).  
171
 Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237. 
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to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the 
possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their 
still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force 
is a suit in this court.172  
However, as many have pointed out, states and agencies often have 
many impediments to pursuing actions in protection of environmental 
entities. These include a wide array of institutional duties and goals assigned 
to them, limited funding, and the conflicts of interest underlying their need 
to appease a vast variety of groups and actors.173 But as the above explication 
surveyed, granting natural entities standing to bring cases on their own 
behalves is wrought with far too many functional and ontological constraints 
to be a feasible solution.   
Instead, the concerns underlying the Court’s decision in Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co. to extend a special solicitude to states bringing suits 
in protection of natural resources is instructive here.174 The Court noted the 
special consideration that “the question of health [and] the character of the 
forests” necessitate in environmental cases.175 Continuing, the Court stated, 
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that 
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by 
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains . . . should 
not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons 
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should 
not be endangered from the same source. If any such demand is 
to be enforced this must be . . . .176  
These same concerns resonate whether the entity bringing the suit is 
the state or another interested group or actor. Therefore, extending a special 
solicitude to any party wishing to bring a suit in protection of the 
environment would seem to warrant these same exigencies, 
“notwithstanding the hesitation that we may feel” regarding the particularity 
or concreteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff or the likelihood that 
the requested relief will redress the challenged harm.177 This is not to say that 
the claims of environmental advocacy groups should be automatically 
assumed meritorious, but rather that in satisfying the traditional standing 
requirements needed to simply get in the door of the courtroom, they 
should receive relaxed consideration. Rather than requiring members to 
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173
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otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the elements required for 
associational standing should be revised in environmental cases to require 
only as follows: (1) that the interests at stake in the case are germane to the 
organization’s purpose; and (2) and that neither the claim asserted nor the 
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.178 
While this solution is not without its own difficulties, the exigency of 
our environmental situation and the broad application that environmental 
protection has to all Americans—indeed all of humanity—warrants this 
conclusion. Taking this incremental step toward environmental 
conservation is much more palatable than the dramatic decision to grant 
natural entities standing outright. It does not go so far as to extend any 
special due process rights or juridical freedoms to environmental entities. 
Rather, it merely recognizes the inherent value that all entities—human or 
otherwise—have, and because of that value, the natural right to be free from 
wanton destruction.179 Extending special solicitude to environmental 
advocacy groups in environmental cases both protects these natural rights 
and promotes the fundamental goals of law.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Corporate and environmental entities have received vastly different 
treatment within U.S. jurisprudence regarding the legal rights that have been 
extended them. These differences have led to the notion of corporations as 
“people,” while environmental entities have been denied even the most 
basic level of judicial rights—standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court’s 
analysis informing this allocation of rights, however, has been inconsistent 
and led to a detrimental understanding of these issues.    
Because both corporate and environmental entities derive their value 
from their relation to humanity, it is only through this lens that the extension 
of legal rights can be properly allocated. The concept of corporate 
personhood counterfeits the exclusive stature held by the human person 
and has a deleterious effect on society as a whole. While corporations can 
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 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
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 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, ¶¶ 339–40 (2d ed.) (“Man must therefore 
respect the particular goodness of every creature, to avoid any disordered use of things which 
would be in contempt of the Creator and would bring disastrous consequences for human 
beings and their environment . . . . Creatures exist only in dependence on each other, to 
complete each other, in the service of each other.”). However, “all men by natural right . . . 
, [may use the earth] to sustain and develop life.” Pope Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, ¶ 38 
(Oct. 20, 1939), http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xii_enc_20101939_summi-pontificatus.html [https://perma.cc/5WXY-G4GJ]. 
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be a useful mechanism for humans to achieve their goals and improve 
society, they are not people and have no value distinct from the humans 
comprising them. Likewise, while protecting the environment is a vital and 
necessary cause, it too cannot be evaluated aside from the benefits it 
provides to humanity. Granting the environment standing, due process, or 
other legal rights is not an effective means of preserving it. Instead, a 
loosening of the standing requirements for associational groups to bring 
suits on behalf of the environment should be pursued in the interest of 
protecting human life and liberty.  
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